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FTPL with Multi-tier Government in Fiscal Federalism: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Tests
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TitleFTPL with Multi-tier Government in Fiscal Federalism: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Tests  
AuthorZhao Wenzhe, Dong Lixia and Lu Di  
OrganizationDepartment of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics; Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management;The School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) - University of London, Department of Economics, Renmin University of China 
Emailwenzhe07@yahoo.com.cn; 
Key WordsFiscal Federalism; Government Tiers; FTPL; Inflation; The Price Level 
AbstractThe paper researches whether FTPL is valid in Chinese-style fiscal federalism after the tax-sharing reform. We address this question theoretically and test it using Panel VAR model. We use a multi-tier government model to construct a FTPL model in fiscal federalism of Chinese style, where the local government can’t make budgetary balance, instead it’s budget constraint is made balance through transfer payments from the central government and loans from commercial banks, while the central government has the right to issue government bonds to finance deficit and realize intertemporal budgetary constraint balance. This paper shows that a decrease of the local government’s surplus could raise the equilibrium price level even without the monetary supply increasing; both the centralization of fiscal revenue and fiscal competition between local governments will increase the price level because it stimulates the fiscal free-riding behaviour of the local government. Therefore, in Chinese-style fiscal federalism, local fiscal authority plays important role in the price level determination, so that fiscal free-riding behaviour of local governments is easy to lead to the price level fluctuant.  
Serial NumberWP206 
Time2012-02-15 
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