Abstract:Based on a large panel data set, we present the stylized facts of rural taxation in China and propose a general theoretical framework in understanding these facts. We argue that the key to the rural taxation problem lies in the un-funded government regulations on rural areas. We also point out the limited effect of fiscal reform in solving the problem. We analyze a series of problems in the ongoing rural taxation reform.

Abstract:We constructed the models using the economic data of H Province and analyzed the operation effect of positive fiscal policy in H Province. We had gotten 9 basic theorems,based on Keynesian theory.Theorem 1:The economy in H Province is operating in the investment trap. So the monetary policy is ineffective and the fiscal policy is perfectly effective.Theorem 2:In H Privince,the fiscal policy multiplier is 5.596,and the multipliers of investment demand and the consumption demand pulled by fiscall policy are 2.3945,2.2015 respectively. And the feed-back multiplier of fiscal expenditure is 0.2266.Theorem 3:The economic growth rate pulled by the transfer loan of government bonds and the subsidy in H Province were 0.6,0.9,0.6,0.5 in 1998,1999,2000,2001 respectively.Theorem 4:The greater the multiplier,the more effect the positive fiscal policy is.But if the policy exits,the negative effect will be greater too.Theorem 5:The lower the degree of individualization,the lower the interest elasticity of investment is.Theorem 6:The lower the degree of individualization,the more dependent on positive fiscal policy is and vice versa.Theorem 7:The positive fiscal policy will retreat inevitably,and the best approach will be a gradual retreat.Theorem 8:The dependence on positive fiscal policy is higher than average.So the autonomous growth drive is awfully inadequate.Theorem 9:If the proper measures are not taken to stimulate private investment,the economic growth rate in H Province will diminish due to the gradual retreat of positive fiscal policy.

Abstract:Based on the incomplete contract theories,this article analyzed some questions on the sale contract of farm produce,and stated that the inherent reasons of the low rate of performance of sale contract of farm produce were incompleteness of the contract.Further,the incompletness of the contracts were divided into two kinds:the “usual" and the “destined",and hence the ways to deal with them through the institutional arrangement would be different also,the former could be solved by the economic,executive,and legal means,however,for the latter,there are still no any effective economic or legal solution until now.The authors focused on the rationale,sign conditions,the failure of performance and relevant institutional arrangements about the latter kind of the incomplete contract,and derived some meanings of incomplete contract on the legal contract theory.We got an important conclusion on the risk sharing that any one side among the two agents of a contract couldnt transfer completely the market risks to the other.

Abstract:We make an empirical research on the relationship between TMT pay gap and future firm performance of Chinas list companies.A positive relationship between them is found,therefore our result support tournament theories.The TMT pay gap determinants of Chinsa list companies are corporate governance factors,while the external environmental factors and the internal characteristics of firms play unimportant roles in its determination.We argue that a larger pay gap should be put into practice in order to provide enough tournament incentive intensity and the main approach to which in the reform of corporate governance.

Abstract:Holding the belief that the entrepreneur is the firms start in logic and the initial “centralized contractual agent",we try to do some positive analysis of the financial contracting in the entrepreneurial perspective.Firstly,we prove that a rational entrepreneur usually gives the prior claim to the exterior investor,thus we negate the traditional idea that the final residual claimer is the investor.It can be subsequently recognized that the entrepreneurs own capital essentially functions as a guarantee for the exterior investor,on the base on which several rules about the entrepreneourial financial contracting are uncovered.Finally,we find it impossible for the entrepreneur to carve out entirely by his own money even without the wealth constraint.An optimal investment ratio may exist.

Abstract:Does the class of shareholdings matter for corporate performanceAccording to the principle of ultimate ownership,our paper found that at present the shareholding structure of Chinese quoted companies is state-dominant in that 84% of public companies are ultimately controlled by the state,compared with 16% of non-state-controlled ones.In contrast to our identified shareholdings,the Chinese official shareholding record only reports the state and the legal person share classes that are inevitably ambiguous for the identification of ultimate owners of public corporations,which in turn has misled many previous studies in assessing the impact of shareholding classes on performance.Based on our newly established shareholding classes,we make a nested performance comparison between these different classes,such as the state direct control versus the state indirect control,and find significant evidence from the Chinese data that the class of shareholdings does matter for company performance.

Abstract:Since 1995,the six countries,Sweden,Italy,Poland,Latvia,Mongolia and Kyrgyz Republic,have successfully transmitted from the conventional PAYGO DB to a quasi-acturaial DC scheme by having introduced a new Social Security model named NDCNotional Defined Contribution,which is a mixed model and a hybrid including a Funded DC component in combination with a PAYGO DB scheme.This new aspiration of European reformers,conceptionally speaking,could be at least dated from the French point-system in 1945 and American Cash Balance PlanCBP in the early 1980s,and theoretically speaking,dated from the J.Buchanans proposal of mandatory purchase of “social insurance bonds” in 1968,and the BKS model PSA,Personal Security Accounts of proposal by Boskin,Kotlikoff and Shoven in 1982. What the features are these two private schemes and the two proposalswhat are the differences between the NDC approach and the four mentioned aboveIt is the old wine with a new bottleThis paper would discuss these topics.

Abstract:In this article we develop an economic growth model which devides knowldge into basic scientific knowledge and applied knowledge. By emphasizing the role of the former in economic growth,we draw three conclusions:first of all,the long-run growth rate of the entity is directly proportional to the one of basic scientific knowledge;next,the long-run growth rate of basic scientific knowldge is determined by the stock of the human capital;finally,non-exclusion of basic scientific knowledge justifies the intervention of government.

Abstract:Chinas nongovernmental enterprise is one of the most conspicuous in the research about Chinese economy of transition. The paper tries to make a review on the research of the nongovernmental enterprise, and to find the clue of Chinas reform. It shows that competition and incentive were emphasized in the early stage, then the ambiguous property rights caught the eye of economists, and now the governments fading out is observed. In the process, the concept of the nongovernmental enterprise changes gradually. When it grows into the enterprise consistent with the theory of mainstream economics, Chinas nongovernmental enterprise isnt concerned about any more. The focus of the research also turns from analysis to solution. Now it is an interesting problem that where the economy will be led after the property rights of the nongovernmental enterprise are well defined.