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Home >> Working Paper
Violent Conflicts in Private Finance:A Research Based on Qing Dynasty’s Homicide Reports
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TitleViolent Conflicts in Private Finance:A Research Based on Qing Dynasty’s Homicide Reports  
AuthorChen Zhiwu, Lin Zhan and Peng Kaixiang  
OrganizationYale University and Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University; Henan University 
Emailzhiwu.chen@yale.edu;linzhan126@126.com;kaixiangp@qq.com 
Key WordsUsury;Extra-economic Compulsions; Moral Economy; Homicide Reports 
AbstractUsing data collected from Qing Dynasty’s homicide reports, this paper explores the relationship between lenders and borrowers, especially their relationship in usury transactions. We find the death probability of lenders increases as the interest rate rises. Our analysis doesn’t support the hypotheses of “usury is exploitation” and “lenders have extra-economic compulsions”. We also find usury could not be comprehensively explained without considering the additional risk premium required for the life risk faced by the lender in the process of enforcing the borrowing contract. Furthermore, moral critics on usury probably increase the likelihood of violence between lenders and borrowers. These findings may help us better understand the needed informal finance reforms. 
Serial NumberWP597 
Time2014-01-28 
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