UserName:
PassWord:
Home >> Working Paper
Tax Competition, Tax Enforcement and Tax Avoidance
Read        DownLoad
TitleTax Competition, Tax Enforcement and Tax Avoidance  
AuthorFan Ziying and Tian Binbin  
OrganizationHuazhong University of Science and Techonology 
Emailivannj@163.com;tianbinux@163.com 
Key WordsTax Avoidance; Tax Enforcement; Income Tax Sharing Reform 
AbstractThis paper uses the Income Tax Sharing Reform in 2002 to identify the tax enforcement and estimates its effect on the avoidance of corporate income tax. The reform attributes the firms to two tax agencies, National Tax Bureau and Local Tax Bureau, according their established date. Tax competition will decrease the tax enforcement of Local Tax Bureau, while does not affect the National Tax Bureau, so the difference of tax enforcement perfectly measures tax competition. Based on 170 000 firms’ data, we find the decreased tax enforcement of Local Tax Bureau induces tax avoidance of firms, which is only robust in firms with enough mobility, such as private firms. We also find the tax enforcement of Local Tax Bureau is caused by the tax effort not the tax capability. These results also explain the helping hand of China local governments and the abnormal increasing of tax revenue. 
Serial NumberWP395 
Time2012-12-07 
  • Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
  • Copyright Economic Research Journal
  • The uploaded articles by this website express the authors’ views, not necessarily the views of this website.
  • Perennial Legal Counsel: Lu Kang (Chong Guang Law Office)
  • ISSN 0577-9154 CN 11-1081/F Postal Distribution Code 2-25l (Domestic) M16 (Overseas)
  • ICP 10211437 (Beijng)
  • No.2,Yuetan Bei Xiaojie, Xicheng District, Beijing 100836, P. R. China
  • Phone/Fax: (+8610) 68034153