Intergovernmental Competition、Land Finance and the Making of China’s Excellent Infrastructures
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| Title | Intergovernmental Competition、Land Finance and the Making of China’s Excellent Infrastructures
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| Author | Tang Yugang, Zhao Daping and He Nianru |
| Organization | Shandong University, Shanghai lixin Universiy of Commerce, PBC |
| Email | tangyugang@126.com |
| Key Words | Infrastructure Investment; Land Finance; Binding BOT |
| Abstract | This paper offers an economic logic of the making of China’s excellent infrastructures after tax sharing system reform. Tax sharing contract is not the major factor to stimulate infrastructure investment. Subsequent vertical fiscal pressure induced local public finance innovation based on the maturing land market, which extended the infrastructure supply capacity significantly. Land finance model and binding BOT model describe the mechanism of supply capacity formation. Super infrastructure demand created by government competition meets super supply capacity. Preliminary empirical test supports the above hypothesis. The mode of infrastructure development reflects the essence of China’s economic growth model after the mid 1990s. |
| Serial Number | WP32 |
| Time | 2011-01-06 |
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