债务展期与结构性去杠杆 阅读全文
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Title | Debt Rollover and Structural Deleverage
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作者 | 张一林 蒲明 |
Author | Zhang Yilin and Pu Ming |
作者单位 | 西南财经大学 |
Organization | Southwestern University Of Finance And Economics |
作者Email | ylzhang@swufe.edu.cn;puming@swufe.edu.cn |
中文关键词 | 去杠杆 债务展期 僵尸企业 经济不确定性 |
Key Words | Deleverage; Debt Rollover; Zombie Firms; Economic Uncertainty |
内容提要 | 本文基于一个银行债务展期的理论框架,考察经济不确定性对银行杠杆决策的影响。研究发现,经济不确定性会扭曲银行的债务展期决策,其后果是,即使企业没有政府的隐性担保,银行决策也不受政府的干预,银行也可能对僵尸企业的债务不断展期,反倒去掉正常企业的杠杆。本文从理论上证明,近年来我国一定程度上出现的保留“坏”杠杆、去掉“好”杠杆的结构性去杠杆现象,很可能是一种由银行债务融资特征引发的市场失灵,而不一定是由政府干预或者企业所有制造成。 |
Abstract | This paper investigates the impact of economic uncertainty on bank’s debt rollover. We find that economic uncertainty distorts bank’s rollover decision in the way that the bank may rollover zombie firms’ debt while deleveraging normal firms’ debt, even in absence of government intervention (subsidies to state-owned enterprises, for example). This implies that in the recent structural deleverage in China, the phenomenon of keeping “bad” leverage while reducing “good” leverage might indicate market failure. |
文章编号 | WP1332 |
登载时间 | 2019-02-12 |
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