国有风险投资的投资行为和投资成效——来自中小板和创业板公司上市前的证据 阅读全文
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Title | Investment Behaviors and Performance of Government - Sponsored Venture Capitals:Evidences from SME and ChiNext Boards
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作者 | 余琰 罗炜 李怡宗 朱琪 |
Author | Yu Yan, Luo Wei, Lee Yi-tsung and Zhu Qi |
作者单位 | 北京大学光华管理学院;第一创业摩根大通证券有限责任公司 |
Organization | Guanhuan School of Management, Beijing University;J.P. Morgan First Capital Securities Co., Ltd |
作者Email | ytlee@gsm.pku.edu.cn |
中文关键词 | 国有风险投资 投资行为 投资期限 投资回报 |
Key Words | Government-sponsored Venture Capital; Investment Behavior; Holding period; Investment Return |
内容提要 | 本文分析风险投资的产权性质对其投资行为和投资成效的影响。研究发现:股权分置改革前,国有风险投资机构更倾向在企业的发展晚期进行投资,并且其所投企业的研发支出更低;而股权分置改革之后,国有风险投资机构也未表现出偏好创业早期的企业,也没有在扶持创新上有显著的价值增加作用。从投资成效来看,股权分置改革前,国有风险投资相对于非国有风险投资,虽然投资持有期限更长,但是取得成本更高而投资收益更低;股权分置改革后国有风险投资的投资期变得更短、回报更高而成本更低。同时,国有风险投资在企业发展晚期进入时能享有更低的投资成本和更高的投资收益,相关结果在控制内生性之后也仍然存在。这些发现说明国有风险投资的表现总体上符合私人利益假说的预期,而不是社会价值假说的预期。 |
Abstract | This paper analyzes the relationship between venture capitals'(VCs) ownership and their investment behaviors and performances. We find that, no evidence shows that government-sponsored VCs (hereafter GSVCs) prefer entering the firms earlier, and provide significant value-added on firms’ innovation. Meanwhile, compared to private sponsored VCs, GSVCs have longer holding period, higher cost and lower return, but after the reformation of non-tradable shares, they enjoy shorter holding period, lower cost and higher return. GSVCs also enjoy more benefits when they enter invested company in late period. These findings show that GSVCs’ behaviors in line with the expectations of the private interests hypothesis. |
文章编号 | WP558 |
登载时间 | 2013-11-20 |
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