分权体制下地市级政府教育支出的标尺竞争
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| Title | Yardstick Competition among Municipal Governments over the Education Expenditure under Decentralized System
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| 作者 | 周亚虹 宗庆庆 |
| Author | Zhou Yahong and Zong Qingqing |
| 作者单位 | 上海财经大学经济学院 |
| Organization | Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | yahong.zhou@mail.shufe.edu.cn; zongqingqing@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 地市级政府 教育支出 标尺竞争 空间面板数据模型 |
| Key Words | Municipal Governments; Education Expenditure ; Yardstick Competition; Spatial Panel Data Model. |
| 内容提要 | 财政分权体制下的地方政府支出竞争行为已成为我国学界关注的热点问题。当前中国正处在由追求简单经济增长向追求社会民生转变的阶段，提供教育公共服务则是保障社会民生的重要方面。本文侧重研究了我国地市级地方政府可能存在的教育支出相互竞争行为。我们提出了一个简单的、中国式的“自上而下”标尺竞争理论模型来解释地市级政府之间教育支出的相互影响机制：上级政府根据地市级政府的相对教育政绩来决定地方官员是否连任，从而引发了地市级政府之间的标尺竞争。论文随后使用2007年至2010年间312个地级市教育支出等数据构建空间面板数据模型，并在固定效应框架下运用GS2SLS和MLE方法实证估计了地市级地方政府教育支出反应方程。实证结果符合理论模型的预期：地市级政府在教育支出上确实存在标尺竞争，经济距离相近地区之间出于标尺竞争的模仿激励基本上要高于地理相邻地区。此外我们还发现，财政分权显著地抑制了地方政府教育支出的增加。 |
| Abstract | The competition among local governments over the expenditure under fiscal decentralized system has been a hot issue in China. China is undergoing the transition stage from the pursuit of economic growth to the pursuit of livelihood, providing education services is the important aspect of protecting the livelihood. This paper focuses on the competition among local governments over the education expenditure. We present a simple theoretical model of Chinese-Style yardstick competition “from the top” to explain the existence of interaction among local governments over the education expenditure: the central government reappoint the local officials on the basis of relative performance in providing education services, thus inducing the yardstick competition among local governments. Then, we use the education expenditure data of 312 cities in China between 2007 and 2010 to construct the spatial panel data model, and apply GS2SLS and MLE methods under the fixed-effects framework to estimate the reaction function of education expenditure. The empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions: there actually is yardstick competition among local governments over the education expenditure, local jurisdictions are more likely to compete with the neighbors that are similar with them economically than these are similar with them geographically. In addition, we find that the fiscal decentralization has significant negative impact on the education expenditure. |
| 文章编号 | WP476 |
| 登载时间 | 2013-06-07 |
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