分税制的契约与改革
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| Title | The Nature and Reform of China’s Tax-sharing System
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| 作者 | 吕冰洋 聂辉华 |
| Author | Lü Bingyang and Nie Huihua |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学 |
| Organization | Renmin University of China |
| 作者Email | lby@ruc.edu.cn；niehuihua@gmail.com |
| 中文关键词 | 分税制 契约 增值税 销售税 |
| Key Words | Tax-sharing System, Contract, Value-added Tax, Retail Tax |
| 内容提要 | 本文认为，中国的分税制本质上是一个弹性的分成契约系统。这是因为，中国的分税制是中央政府、地方政府、企业（或居民）这三类经济主体之间的关于剩余分配的各种子契约的组合。这些子契约可归为四种基本形式——固定工资契约、固定价格契约、分权契约和分成契约，并且它们之间具有很强的互补性，由此构成了一个富有弹性的激励系统。在信息不对称的条件下，这个激励系统能够有效地减少地方政府的机会主义行为，增强地方政府发展经济的激励。但是以财政收入和经济增长为主要目标的激励机制会扭曲地方政府的努力水平，加剧重复建设和粗放型增长模式，并催生地方政府的二元财政和土地财政问题。我们认为，开征销售税、重构分税制的形式是当下分税制改革困境的破解之道。 |
| Abstract | In this paper, we take China’s Tax-sharing System as a flexible revenue-sharing contract, because the Tax-sharing System is a combination of a series of specific contracts on residual distribution among central government, local governments, and enterprises (or citizen). These specific contracts can be classified as four kinds---fixed wage contracts, fixed price contracts, decentralized contracts, and revenue-sharing contracts, which are complementary and form a flexible incentive system. Under asymmetric information the incentive system satisfies local governments’ participation and compatibility constraints, reduces their opportunism behavior, and strengthens their motivation on economic growth. But the main object targeting on fiscal revenue and economic growth will distort the direction of local governments’ effort, lead to redundant projects, extensive growth model, and furthermore lead to “tax-and-fee financial system” and “land finance”. We suggest that Chinese government should impose retail tax and adjust the division of routine power and financial power between different levels of government. |
| 文章编号 | WP393 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-11-09 |
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