任人唯亲的董事会文化和经理人超额薪酬问题——来自我国上市公司的证据
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| Title | Cronyism of Board Culture and Excessive Executive Compensations-Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms
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| 作者 | 郑志刚 孙娟娟 Rui Oliver |
| Author | Zheng Zhigang, Sun Juanjuan and Rui Oliver |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学财政金融学院，中欧商学院 |
| Organization | School of Finance, Renmin University of China; Chinese University of Hongkong |
| 作者Email | zhengzhigang@ruc.edu.cn； |
| 中文关键词 | 经理人超额薪酬 董事会文化特征 任人唯亲 公司治理 |
| Key Words | Excessive Executive Compensations; Culture Characteristics of the Board; Cronyism and Corporate Governance. |
| 内容提要 | 本文从任人唯亲的董事会文化视角实证考察了我国上市公司中存在的经理人超额薪酬问题。在控制了导致经理人超额薪酬的潜在制度特征后，本文的研究表明经理人超额薪酬与任人唯亲的董事会文化有关，而通过由股东而不是上市公司发放董事（长）薪酬将有助于打破任人唯亲的董事会文化，减缓经理人超额薪酬问题。本文从而以经理人超额薪酬为例为董事会的文化特征将影响董事会监督经理人的有效性提供了证据。 |
| Abstract | This paper empirically explores the causes and economic consequences of excessive executive compensations from the perspective of cronyism of board culture based on China’s listed firms. After controlling for the potentially influential institutional characteristics of board on executive excessive compensation, we show that cronyism of board culture would lead to excessive executive compensations and to disperse compensations to the directors (chairman) through the investors (such as controlling shareholders), instead of the listed firms will refrain excessive executive compensations. This paper therefore provides evidence that besides the institutional characteristics, culture characteristics of the board will also affect the effectiveness of the board independence by using excessive executive compensations as an example. |
| 文章编号 | WP215 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-02-08 |
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