官僚规模、社会福利与治理结构
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| Title | Bureaucracy Scale, Social Welfare and Governance Structure
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| 作者 | 桂林 陈宇峰 尹振东 |
| Author | Gui Lin, Chen Yufeng and Yin Zhendong |
| 作者单位 | 江西财经大学经济学院；浙江工商大学经济学院；山东大学经济学院 |
| Organization | School of Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics, Zhejiang Gongshang University;School of Economics, Shandong University |
| 作者Email | glnavy@sina.com； |
| 中文关键词 | 官僚规模 社会福利 治理结构 寻租 |
| Key Words | Governance Structure; Bureaucracy Scale; Rent Seeking; Power Structure |
| 内容提要 | 本文试图从经济学的视角分析三种治理机制下官僚规模的决定、不同治理机制对社会福利的不同影响以及不同治理机制在不同经济环境下的可行性。官僚治理机制存在着两难困境（官僚悖论）：官僚的收益来自于其权力大小，官僚治理下要激励官僚努力提供公共品，官僚的权力需足够大；而官僚的权力越大，其寻租空间也越大。分析表明当人口总数增加、社会生产率差异增大、社会生产率提高时，首领越可能选择官僚治理，官僚规模越有可能膨胀。社会生产率较高时，在生产者治理机制下，此时让生产者成为官僚的机会成本较高，生产者会“惜产”，社会福利最优的结果可以被生产者治理机制实施。生产者治理机制具有较广的适用性，也就是说的生产者治理机制可行域包含官僚治理机制的可行域。 |
| Abstract | This paper attempts to analyze how the bureaucratic scale to be decided under three different governance mechanisms, by which social welfare will be influenced. We show that different governance structures adapt to different economic environments. And there is a dilemma under governance by bureaucrats (Bureaucratic Paradox): to encourage bureaucrats pay more efforts to product public goods, more power bureaucrats should be allocated, because bureaucrats’ revenue comes from power they own; but more power more corruption. If the population, differences in social productivity or social productivity increasing, heads will prefer governance by bureaucrats more, which show us an expansion of bureaucracy scale. The higher social productivity is, the higher cost of producers is under governance by producers, which will encourage producers to hire less bureaucrats. And the first best solution can be implemented if social productivity is higher enough. Furthermore, governance by producers is more applicable than other governance mechanisms. |
| 文章编号 | WP21 |
| 登载时间 | 2010-11-26 |
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